Pakistan's Terror Groups Adapt Strategies Amid Increased Scrutiny

Shifts in Terrorist Operations

Recent observations indicate that terrorist organizations operating from Pakistan are modifying their internal structures. Security analysts tracking cross-border activities report that Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is in the process of establishing two new training centers, which will include facilities aimed at training women for roles beyond their traditional functions. Concurrently, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) is ramping up its fundraising efforts linked to religious educational institutions in Bahawalpur. These changes come in the wake of increased scrutiny of Pakistan's terror infrastructure following Operation Sindoor, which reportedly disrupted various facilitation channels and revealed communication patterns between operatives and their handlers.

LeT’s Women Wing: New Directions

LeT’s Women Wing: Expanding Roles

Historically, the women’s division of LeT has focused primarily on ideological promotion and social mobilization. However, recent intelligence reports suggest a significant expansion of their responsibilities. Statements attributed to Iffat Saeed, who is believed to lead the women’s wing, indicate a shift towards operational support roles.

Notably, OsintTV, an open-source intelligence platform, highlighted a recent speech by Iffat Saeed, where she called for jihad and radicalized her audience. Senior LeT member Abdur Rauf was reportedly present during a visit to Markaz Quba Al Islam in Islamabad on February 19, where expansion efforts are said to include dedicated training spaces for women. Analysts believe that women may increasingly take on roles as overground workers (OGWs), assisting with safehouse management, courier services, reconnaissance, and communication tasks. Additionally, a report from Resonant News indicates that LeT's training for women includes indoctrination disguised as 'empowerment' through affiliates like the Pakistan Markazi Muslim League and the Muslim Women's League, both associated with Hafiz Saeed's family.

The OGW Model: A New Approach

The OGW Model: Decentralised Resilience

The overground worker model has become crucial for modern terrorist networks, particularly those based in Pakistan. Unlike traditional training camps located in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, OGW operations rely on civilian integration, providing shelter, intelligence, transportation, and financial support while maintaining a low profile.

Intelligence reports accessed by analysts reveal that both LeT and JeM have increased their infiltration attempts and logistical operations along the Line of Control since September 2025, with assistance from Pakistan's Special Services Group (SSG) and ISI operatives. LeT is known to receive training from the SSG commandos, organizing programs that include weapon handling for various firearms and explosives. These training sessions are categorized into Daura-e-Aam, a 21-day course, and Daura-e-Khas, a three-month specialized program. Clerics associated with the group also undergo a 42-day training course, while recruits participate in an introductory program called Bait-ur-Rizwan.

JeM’s Recruitment Strategies

JeM’s Bahawalpur Pipeline

Simultaneously, JeM is enhancing its recruitment strategies. Security briefings indicate that Markaz Subhanallah in Bahawalpur has intensified its calls for sponsorship of students engaged in Quranic memorization and clerical training. Reportedly, the sponsorship costs are set at PKR 16,500 monthly or PKR 198,000 annually per student. According to Third Eye OSINT & Analysis, Markaz Subhanallah spans 18 acres and is equipped with modern facilities, including a swimming pool. Intelligence estimates suggest that around 1,400 individuals from various regions, including Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, are currently enrolled. This center is reportedly funded by the ISI-linked Al-Rahmat Trust and serves as a hub for terror indoctrination. After completing their religious studies, select individuals are directed towards advanced training programs in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and PoK.

Following the setbacks from Operation Sindoor, JeM has initiated discreet Urdu social media campaigns since August 2025, soliciting funds to rebuild its complex under the leadership of Masood Azhar's brother, Mufti Abdul Rauf Asghar, framing the effort as a community-building initiative despite UN sanctions. The Jamia Al-Sabir, established in 2003 by Bakhsh Sabir, is well-documented in security reports as part of JeM’s ideological framework. While JeM consistently denies any involvement in cross-border terrorism, Indian intelligence agencies assert that Bahawalpur serves as a doctrinal and organizational center for the group.

Financial Strategies and Community Legitimacy

Faith-Based Fundraising and Financial Channels

Experts in security finance highlight that presenting sponsorship as a form of religious education grants community legitimacy and ensures consistent funding. The zakat and charity system has historically been exploited by terrorist organizations to merge social outreach with recruitment efforts. By formalizing donation tiers, these groups can secure ongoing revenue while minimizing overt associations with terrorism.

According to retired Major General Sanjay Soi, “Structured sponsorship is more challenging to contest than direct arms funding — it occupies a grey area between faith and facilitation.” JeM's sponsorship model of PKR 16,500 monthly or PKR 198,000 annually through Jamia Al-Sabir mirrors LeT's charity initiatives, which are tolerated by Punjab authorities despite pressure from international watchdogs like FATF.

Post-Operation Adjustments

Post-Operation Sindoor: Strategic Adjustment

Operation Sindoor has reportedly disrupted communication networks and exposed handler connections related to cross-border operations. Officials familiar with the aftermath of the operation indicate that the result has been a recalibration of organizational strategies rather than a retreat.

The integration of women into LeT and JeM’s focus on madrassa-based recruitment suggest a strategy aimed at reinforcing their operational depth while reducing visibility. The current emphasis appears to be on resilience, ensuring continuity of manpower and adaptability in logistics under increased surveillance.

Implications for Regional Security

Broader Regional Implications

These developments illustrate how terrorist networks adapt under pressure. Instead of large-scale mobilization or camp expansions, current trends indicate a layered, decentralized growth strategy. Recruitment through faith-based institutions and logistical embedding via OGWs suggest long-term consolidation efforts.

Security officials warn that such structural changes often precede periods of low-profile activity rather than immediate escalation. Whether these adjustments lead to a renewed operational tempo remains uncertain and will likely depend on geopolitical factors and regional security dynamics. For now, the visible trend is not one of overt expansion but rather a quiet restructuring.