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Pakistan's Army Chief Faces Dilemma Amid Rising Shia Mobilization

Pakistan's Army Chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, is grappling with the challenges posed by the increasing pro-Iran Shia mobilization within the country. As Pakistan seeks to mediate between Iran and the US, it faces a dilemma: how to counter this growing movement without provoking Iran. The military has turned to hardline Sunni groups like Sipah-e-Sabah and Jamaat-ud-Dawah to address the situation, raising concerns about potential violence. This article delves into the complexities of Pakistan's geopolitical ambitions and the implications of its internal sectarian dynamics.
 

Challenges for Pakistan's Military Leadership

For Field Marshal Asim Munir, the Chief of the Army Staff in Pakistan, managing the growing pro-Iran Shia mobilization has become increasingly challenging. This movement poses a significant threat as it gains momentum, yet the military establishment is caught in a bind, unable to deploy its official resources against the Shia groups.


Pakistan has opted for a mediating role between Iran and the United States, necessitating a stance of neutrality. Any aggressive measures against Shia mobilization could provoke Iran, a situation Islamabad is keen to avoid.


To address this issue, officials have indicated that Pakistan is reactivating its proxies. The Army Chief has instructed hardline Sunni factions, including the Sipah-e-Sabah (SeS) and Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD), to counter the Shia supporters rallying for Iran. Historically, these groups have assisted the Pakistani establishment, particularly during protests demanding justice for the imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan.


Members of SeS and JuD, who enjoy the backing of the military and intelligence services, have been granted leeway to engage in violent actions against dissenters, according to an official source.


The SeS, a banned Sunni Deobandi Islamist group established in 1985, was created specifically to counter Shia influence in Pakistan. It has a notorious history of sectarian violence, particularly against the Shia organization, Sipah-e-Muhammad.


Conversely, the JuD operates as the charitable arm of Lashkar-e-Taiba and adheres to the Ahl-i Hadith interpretation of Islam, closely aligned with Wahhabism and Salafism.


An intelligence official noted that by involving these groups, the Army Chief aims to suppress Shia mobilization without implicating the state directly. This strategy allows for plausible deniability in discussions with Iran, as the violence can be attributed to these organizations rather than the government.


International scrutiny of such violence is expected, yet the establishment plans to deflect responsibility onto SeS and JuD, maintaining that it has no connection to their actions.


Another official revealed that both groups have been granted immunity, allowing them to operate freely.


With this strategy in place, it is anticipated that violent confrontations with Shia groups will escalate in Pakistan.


By positioning itself as a mediator between Iran and the US, Pakistan seeks to enhance its geopolitical significance. Field Marshal Munir has taken the initiative to engage directly with Iranian President Masood Pezeshkian and is also leveraging relationships with Gulf nations and the US.


Pakistan's desire for geopolitical relevance means it cannot afford to suppress the Shia mobilization openly. Angering Iran at this critical juncture could jeopardize its mediation efforts and diminish its geopolitical stature.


The JuD and SeS have welcomed the Army Chief's directives, as they have historically aligned with anti-Shia agendas. Officials assert that both groups have long-standing motivations against the Shia community, making Munir's offer appealing to them.